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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we present the stream cipher QUAD and the provable
security arguments supporting its conjectured strength for suitable
parameter values. QUAD was first proposed at Eurocrypt 2006
by Berbain and co-workers [Berbain, C., Gilbert, H., Patarin, J.,
2006b. QUAD: A practical stream cipher with provable security. In:
Vaudenay, S. (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2006.
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag]. It relies
on the iteration of a set of multivariate quadratic polynomials
over a finite field, typically GF(2) or a small extension. We show
that in the binary case, the security of the keystream generation
can be related, in the concrete security model, to the conjectured
intractability of the MQ problem of solving a random system of m
equations in n unknowns. We show furthermore that this security
reduction can be extended to incorporate the key and IV setup and
provide a security argument related to the whole stream cipher.
We also briefly address software and hardware performance issues
and show that if one is willing to pseudo-randomly generate the
sets of quadratic polynomials underlying the cipher, this leads to
surprisingly inexpensive hardware implementations of QUAD.
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1. Introduction
Symmetric ciphers can be broadly classified into twomain families of encryption algorithms: block
ciphers and stream ciphers. Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers do not produce a key dependent
permutation over a large block space, but give a key dependent sequence of numbers over a small
alphabet, typically the binary alphabet {0, 1}. To encrypt a plaintext sequence, each plaintext symbol
is combined with the corresponding symbol of the keystream sequence by using a group operation,
usually the exclusive or operation over {0, 1}. Nearly all stream ciphers specified recently use two
inputs to generate a keystream sequence: a secret key and an additional parameter named the initial
value (IV ) that is generally not secret. The use of IV s allows one to derive several independent
keystream sequences from a single key by resynchronizing the stream cipher each time with a
new IV .
The current status of stream cipher design is characterized by a considerable discrepancy between
theory and practice.
On the theoretical side, seminal work by Shamir (1981), Blum and Micali (1984), Yao (1982) and
Goldreich and Levin (1989) in the early 80’s produced the well founded theory of pseudo-random
generators, which represents one of the major achievements in the area of provable security. A
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) can be viewed as an IV-less stream cipher. It expands
a short seed, e.g. a key, into a larger bit string in such a way that if the input seed is secret and
randomly drawn, then the resulting output is computationally indistinguishable from a perfect
random sequence. The research effort on security proofs for PRNGs has not only led to remarkable
generic results, e.g. the proof byHåstad et al. (1999) that a secure PRNG can be constructed on the basis
of any one-way function (OWF); it has also led to ‘‘provably secure’’ PRNG constructions exploiting
the conjectured one-wayness of some specific permutation or function f , which generally rely on
the iteration of f and the extraction of a few bits at each iteration. The first construction of this
type was introduced by Blum and Micali (1984). Its security reduction relates the security of the
PRNG to the one-wayness of exponentiation modulo a prime number. The construction proposed
by Blum et al. (1986) exploits the conjectured intractability of quadratic residuosity modulo Blum
integers. Alexi, Chor, Goldreich and Schnorr proposed a construction whose security relies upon the
RSA assumption. Impagliazzo and Naor (1996) proposed a construction relying on the difficulty of
the subset sum problem. More recently, some efficiency improvements were achieved, either by
decreasing the state length as in Fischer and Stern (1996)’s construction based on the intractability of
the syndrome decoding problem, or by increasing the number of bits extracted at each iteration of f
as illustrated in Gennaro’s construction based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem
and Boneh et al. (2001)’s construction and in Steinfeld et al. (2006)’s construction respectively based
on the conjectured pseudo-randomness and one-wayness of RSAwith small inputs. However, current
provably secure PRNGs are still generally regarded as too complex and inefficient to provide really
practical stream ciphers. The lack, for these various algorithms, of an extra IV parameter represents
an additional drawback.
On the practical side, extremely efficient stream ciphers have been proposed, which allow (like
SCREAM from Halevi et al. (2002), RC4 from Rivest (1992), SNOW 2.0 from Ekdahl and Johansson
(2002) and its UMTS variant SNOW 3G) much faster software encryption than existing block ciphers
such as AES and/or require much lower computing resources for hardware implementations, like
GRAIN from Hell et al. (2005) and TRIVIUM from Cannière and Preneel (2005) which are two of the
most promising ciphers selected in the final portfolio of the stream cipher competition eSTREAM
of the European project ECRYPT. However, the design of secure stream ciphers is not currently as
well understood as the design of secure block ciphers. The state of the art of the cryptanalysis of
stream ciphers has evolved significantly over the last ten years with the development of attack
techniques such as algebraic attacks, fast correlation and linear masking attacks, resynchronization
attacks against IV dependent stream ciphers, and it turns out that many recent proposals still suffer
from security weaknesses. This is illustrated by the fact that more than one third of the 34 algorithms
submitted in 2005 to the eSTREAM stream ciphers competition have already been shown to be
insecure.
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The main design objective of QUAD was to contribute to reducing the discrepancy between
practical stream ciphers and provably secure PRNG constructions depicted above by specifying a
practical stream cipher with provable security arguments. Instead of relying upon the conjectured
intractability of number theoretical problems – e.g. the factoring and discrete logarithm problems –
like most provably secure PRNG constructions proposed so far, QUAD relies upon the conjectured
intractability of solving a system of m multivariate quadratic equations in n unknowns over
a finite field GF(q), e.g. GF(2). We call this problem MQ. MQ is known to be NP-hard and
conjectured to be intractable in terms of average complexity even for extremely compact
instances. Thus QUAD belongs to the promising and fast expanding family of multivariate
cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, unlike asymmetric multivariate algorithms relying upon the
intractability of the MQ problem proposed so far, e.g. HFE from Patarin (1996) or UOV from
Kipnis et al. (1999), QUAD can be based on a random instance of MQ without any embedded
trapdoor since QUAD is a stream cipher and the computations performed at the sending and
receiving ends do not require any inversion of a MQ instance. In other words, QUAD’s security
relies more directly on the intractability of the MQ problem than asymmetric multivariate
algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows. We first summarize the status of the MQ problem (Section 2).
We then describe the QUAD algorithm (Section 3) and recall basic security definitions in a concrete
(non-asymptotic) security model (Section 4). We show that in the GF(2) case, the security of QUAD’s
keystream generator can be provably related to the conjectured intractability of the MQ problem
(Section 5). We show how to extend this proof, also in the GF(2) case, so as to incorporate the key
and IV setup to get a security reduction for the whole cipher (Section 6). Finally, we address software
and hardware implementation issues (Section 7).
2. Multivariate quadratic systems
We consider a finite field GF(q). A multivariate quadratic equation (or equivalently a
multivariate quadratic polynomial) in n variables over GF(q) is a polynomial of degree at most 2







βixi + γ ,
where coefficients αi,j, βi, and γ are elements of GF(q). In the particular case q = 2, which is the one
most often considered in the sequel, monomials xixi and xi are equal.
It is easy to see that the set Q of multivariate quadratic polynomials in n variables is an N-
dimensional vector space over GF(q), where N = 12n(n+ 3)+ 1 if q 6= 2 and N = 12n(n+ 1) + 1
if q = 2. A basis of this vector space is given by the N − 1 distinct monomial functions of degree 1
or 2 and the non-zero constant polynomial. Any element of Q can be represented by the N-tuple of
its GF(q) coefficients in this basis. Throughout the rest of this paper, we mean by a randomly chosen
quadratic polynomial in n unknowns a quadratic polynomial represented in this basis by a uniformly
and independently drawn N-tuple of GF(q) coefficients.
A multivariate quadratic system S consists of anm-tuple (Q1, . . . ,Qm) ofm quadratic polynomials
in n variables over GF(q). In the sequel, we mean by a randomly chosen system of m quadratic
polynomials in n unknowns, an m-tuple of independently and randomly chosen quadratic
polynomials. Such a system is represented by mN coefficients uniformly and independently drawn
from GF(q).
We define the problem of solving a multivariate quadratic system (MQ problem) as follows: given
a multivariate quadratic system S = (Q1, . . . ,Qm), of m quadratic polynomials over GF(q), find a
value x ∈ GF(q)n, if any, such that Qi(x) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Depending on the respective values of n andm, instances of MQ can be either easy or very difficult
to solve. Form = 1 the number of solutions is established in Lidl and Niederreiter (1997): depending
on the respective parities of n and q, the number of solutions of the quadratic equation Q = 0
associated with a non-degenerate quadratic form Q on n unknowns over GF(q) is either equal to
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qn−1 or only differs from qn−1 by an additional term of about q
n−1
2 . It is consequently quite easy to
find a solution. When m is significantly smaller than n, that is for an underdefined quadratic system,
Courtois et al. (2002) show that finding a solution is much easier than the exhaustive search on the
number of variables. The exact complexity depends on parameters n,m and q. In the opposite situation
of an overdefined system (m > n) containing nearly N linearly independent quadratic equations,
solving anMQ problem is easy, by linearization. The total complexity is then only O(n6). However, for
general values ofm and n the MQ problem is known to be NP-hard, even when restricted to quadratic
equations over GF(2) (see Garey and Johnson (1979) and Fraenkel and Yesha (1980)) or over any finite
field (see Patarin and Goubin (1997)).
Moreover, what makes the MQ problem particularly well suited for cryptographic applications
is that it is conjectured to be very difficult not only asymptotically and in worst case, but already
for small suitably selected values of m and n and in terms of the average complexity of solving
a random instance. The problem seems to be most difficult when m is close to n. For m = n
and q = 2, the complexity of the best known solving algorithms is 2n−O(√n) and thus rather
close to the complexity of exhaustive search, and totally out of the reach of existing computers
when n is larger than 100. Even when q = 2 and m = kn, where k > 1 is small enough
compared with n2 , the best known algorithms XL from Courtois et al. (2000) and improved variants
of Buchberger (1965)’s Gröbner basis computation algorithm such as Faugère (1999)’s F4 and F5
algorithms are exponential in n for a randomly chosen quadratic system (or more precisely for a
regular/semi-regular quadratic system). In cryptography, much research has been dedicated in the
past few years to the above problem (see Courtois and Patarin (2003) and Courtois et al. (2000)). In
particular, it has been shown by Faugère et al. (2004) that XL cannot be more efficient than F5. Bardet
(2004)’s Ph.D. thesis provides an accurate analysis of the complexity of F5, which is the most efficient
algorithm computing Gröbner bases known to solve a random system of m = kn equations in n
unknowns.
3. The stream cipher QUAD
This section describes the stream cipher QUAD, whose specification was first published in Berbain
et al. (2006b). Let S = (Q1, . . . ,Qkn) denote a multivariate quadratic function described by a system
of kn randomly chosen polynomials in n variables over GF(q), and S0 and S1 denote two additional
multivariate quadratic functions described by two (k times smaller) systems of n randomly chosen
polynomials in n variables over GF(q). S, S0 and S1 are fixed and publicly known. In order to get a
general description of the algorithm, we distinguish S, S0 and S1. However S0 and S1 can be extracted
from the larger system S in order to get a more efficient implementation of the algorithm. During
the key and IV loading and the keystream generation, the internal register state is an n-tuple x =
(x1, . . . , xn) of GF(q) values.
3.1. Keystream generation and encryption
The keystream generation process simply consists of iterating the three following steps in order to
produce (k− 1)n keystream values of GF(q) at each iteration:
• Step 1: compute the kn-tuple of GF(q) values S(x) = (Q1(x), . . . ,Qkn(x)), where x is the current
value of the internal state;
• Step 2: output the keystream sequence Sout(x) = (Qn+1(x), . . . ,Qkn(x)) of (k−1)n values of GF(q);
• Step 3: update the internal state xwith the sequence of the first n generated GF(q) values Sin(x) =
(Q1(x), . . . ,Qn(x)).
Themaximal length of the keystream sequence that can be generatedwith a single (key, IV ) pair is
set to L symbols of GF(q). In order to encrypt a plaintext of length ` ≤ L symbols of GF(q), each of the
first ` values of the keystream sequence is added (using the GF(q) addition) with the corresponding
plaintext value.
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3.2. Key and IV setup
Before generating any keystream, we need to initialize the internal state xwith the key K and the
initialization vector IV , which are respectively represented by a sequence of GF(q) elements of length
|K | and a binary sequence of {0, 1} values of length |IV |. We assume from now on and in order to
simplify the subsequent proofs that |K | is chosen exactly equal to n.
The initialization is done as follows: we first set the value of the internal state x to the GF(q)n
value K . Then for each of the |IV | bits (IV1, . . . , IV|IV |) of the IV value the internal state x is updated as
follows: if IVi = 0, x is replaced by the GF(q)n value S0(x); otherwise, x is replaced by the GF(q)n value
S1(x). These |IV | steps provide a key and IV dependent value of the internal state x. We then clock the
cipher n additional times as described in Section 3.1, but without outputting the keystream. After this
preliminary runup phase, the keystream is generated as described in Section 3.1.
4. Basic security notions
We first recall definitions of advantages for distinguishing a number generator from a perfect
random generator as well as a function generator from a perfect random function generator, and
the notions of Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) and Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). All
the security definitions used throughout this paper relate to the concrete (non-asymptotic) security
model. In the sequel, when we state that a value u is randomly chosen in a set U , we implicitly mean
that u is drawn according to the uniform law over U .
4.1. Single-query distinguisher for a number generator
Let us consider a number generator g : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}L with input and output lengths L > n,
used to expand an n-bit secret random seed into an L-bit sequence. A distinguisher in time t for g is
a probabilistic testing algorithm A which when input with an L-bit string outputs either 0 or 1 with
time complexity at most t . We define the advantage of A for distinguishing g from a perfect random
generator as
Advprngg (A) =
∣∣Prx∈{0,1}n(A(g(x)) = 1)− Pry∈{0,1}L(A(y) = 1)∣∣,
where the probabilities are not only taken over the values of an unknown randomly chosen x ∈ {0, 1}n
or of a randomly chosen y ∈ {0, 1}L, as explicitly stated in the above formula, but also over the random
choices of the probabilistic algorithm A.
We define the advantage for distinguishing the function g in time t as
Advprngg (t) = maxA {Adv
prng
g (A)},
where the maximum is taken over all testing algorithms of time complexity at most t .
4.2. Multiple-query distinguisher for a number generator
Let us still consider a number generator g : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}L with input and output lengths
L > n. A q-query distinguisher in time t for g is a probabilistic testing algorithm Awhich, when given
as input a q-tuple of L-bit strings, outputs either 0 or 1 with time complexity at most t . We define the
advantage of A for distinguishing g from a perfect random generator as
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Advprngg (A) =
∣∣Pr(A(g(x1), . . . , g(xq)) = 1)− Pr(A(y1, . . . , yq) = 1)∣∣,
where the probabilities are taken over the q-tuples of independent random n-bit values xi or of L-bit
values yi, and over the random choices of the probabilistic algorithm A. We also define the advantage
for distinguishing the function g in time t with q queries as
Advprngg (t, q) = maxA {Adv
prng
g (A)},
where the maximum is taken over all testing algorithms A of time complexity at most t and using q
inputs.
4.3. Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
A function g is said to be a PRNG if Advprngg (t) is negligible (for example less than 2
−40) for
values of t strictly lower than a fixed threshold (for example 280 or 2128). The definition of a PRNG
is therefore dependent upon thresholds reflecting the current perception of an acceptably secure
number generator.
4.4. Distinguisher for a function generator
Let us now consider a function generator, i.e. a family F = {fK } of n-bit to m-bit functions
indexed by a key K randomly chosen from {0, 1}k. A distinguisher in time t with q queries for F is
a probabilistic testing algorithm Af capable of querying an n-bit to m-bit oracle function f up to q
times. Such an algorithm allows us to distinguish a function fK randomly chosen from F from a perfect
random function f ∗ randomly chosen from the set F∗n,m of all {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m functions with a
distinguishing advantage
AdvprfF (A) =
∣∣Pr(AfK = 1)− Pr(Af ∗ = 1)∣∣,
where the probabilities are taken over K ∈ {0, 1}k or f ∗ ∈ F∗n,m, the set of n-bit tom-bit functions, and
over the random choices of A. We define the advantage for distinguishing the family F in time t with
q queries as
AdvprfF (t, q) = maxA {Adv
prf
F (A)},
where the maximum is taken over all testing algorithms A working in time at most t and capable of
querying an n-bit tom-bit oracle function up to q times.
4.5. Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)
A family of functions F = {fK } is said to be a PRF if AdvprfF (t, q) is negligible for values of t and q
strictly lower than some fixed thresholds (for example 280 or 2128 for t and 240 for q).
5. Security of the keystream generation
We now relate, in the GF(2) case, the PRNG-indistinguishability of the keystream generation part
of QUAD to the conjectured intractability of the MQ problem. This security reduction is expressed
by Theorem 5 hereafter. The proof of Theorem 5 is divided in three parts. The details are given in
Appendices A–E.
5.1. Part 1: Distinguishing the keystreamallows us to distinguish the output of a randomquadratic function
In the first part (Theorem1),weprove that if the L-bit keystreamsequence associatedwith a known
randomly chosen system S ofm = kn quadratic polynomials and an unknown randomly chosen initial
internal state x ∈ {0, 1}n is distinguishable from the L-bit output of a perfectly uniformgenerator, then
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for a known random quadratic system S of m = kn polynomials and an unknown randomly chosen
input value x ∈ {0, 1}n, S(x) is distinguishable from a random kn-bit word. Though we consider a
randomly chosen system S because we need distinguishing properties related to a random system in
the sequel, the property that we prove would also hold if we considered a fixed system S. Our proof in
Appendix A is inspired by the proof given in Goldwasser and Bellare (2001) that a similar result holds
for the generator based on iteration of any fixed n-bit tom-bit function, wherem > n, but provides a
tighter bound for the advantage than Goldwasser and Bellare (2001). A proof of Theorem 1 is provided
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let L = λ(k − 1)n be the number of keystream bits produced using λ iterations of our
construction and let TS denote the time complexity of each iteration. Suppose there exists an algorithm A
that distinguishes the L-bit keystream sequence associated with a known randomly chosen system S of
m = kn quadratic polynomials in n unknowns and an unknown randomly chosen initial internal state
x ∈ {0, 1}n from a random L-bit sequence in time T with advantage . Then there exists an algorithm B
that, for a known randomly chosen S, distinguishes the output S(x) associated with an unknown random
input x from a random value of size kn in time T ′ = T + λTS with advantage λ .
5.2. Part 2: Distinguishing the output of a random quadratic function allows us to predict any linear
function of its input
In the second part (Theorem 2), we prove that if for a known randomly chosen quadratic system S
and an unknown randomly chosen x, there exists a distinguisher allowing us to distinguish S(x) from
a random kn-bit word such as the one considered in Theorem 1 above, then it can be converted into
an algorithm allowing us, for any n-bit to 1-bit quadratic function R, in particular any linear form R,
to predict R(x) better than at random for a randomly chosen n bit value x. A proof of Theorem 2 is
provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that, given a randomly chosen known system S of kn
multivariate quadratic polynomials in n unknowns, distinguishes S(x), where x is an unknown random
input value, from a random string of length kn with advantage at least  and in time T . Then there exists
an algorithm B that, given a randomly chosen quadratic system S of kn polynomials in n unknowns, any
n-bit to 1-bit quadratic form R, and y = S(x) where x is a random input value, predicts R(x) with success
probability at least 12 + 4 using at most T ′ = T + 2TS operations, where TS denotes the time complexity
of computing kn multivariate quadratic polynomials in n unknowns.
5.3. Part 3: Predicting any linear function of the input of a quadratic function allows us to invert it
In the third part (Theorem 4), we show that if for a fixed or random quadratic system S and
more generally any fixed or random n-bit to m-bit function f there exists a predictor such as the
one considered in the former theorem, i.e. a predictor allowing us, given an n-bit to 1-bit linear form
R, to predict R(x) with a success probability (over all S and x values) strictly larger than 12 , then a
preimage of S(x) (resp. f (x)) can be efficiently computed, so that S (resp. f ) is not one way. This part is
essentially a proof of the Goldreich–Levin theorem (Goldreich and Levin, 1989), in which a fast Walsh
transform computation is used to get a tighter reduction. In order to prove Theorem 4 which relates
to the computation, given the image S(x) or f (x), for a random unknown value x and a random system
S, of a list containing x, we first establish a lemma representing the technical core of the proof, in
which a fixed (unknown) value of x is considered. Our proof (Appendix C) is inspired by the simplified
treatment of the original Goldreich–Levin proofs developed by Rackoff and by Goldreich (2001) and
Bellare (1999), and also by the proofs provided by Håstad and Näslund (2000).
Lemma 3. Let us denote by x a fixed unknown n-bit value and denote by f a fixed n-bit to m-bit function.
Suppose that f (x) is known and that there exists an algorithm B that, using this knowledge, allows us, when
given a linear function R of n unknowns, to output a response bit equal to R(x)with probability 12 +  over
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R, using at most T operations. Then there exists a probabilistic algorithm C which produces in time at most
T ′ a list of at most 4n2−2 values such that the probability that x appears in this list is at least 1/2:














where Tf denotes the time complexity of an evaluation of function f .
This lemma applies to a fixed x and a fixed system S (or a fixed n-bit tom-bit function f ). However,
the success probability of the predictor of Theorem 2 is taken over all (x, S) pairs for any linear form R.
Consequently, we need a theorem proved in Appendix D allowing us to exploit the existence of such
a predictor to show the applicability of the lemma to a non-negligible fraction of (x, S) pairs.
Theorem 4. Suppose there exists an algorithm B that, given a randomly chosen quadratic system S of m
quadratic polynomials in n unknowns, a randomly chosen n-bit to 1-bit quadratic form R and the image
S(x) of a randomly chosen (unknown) n-bit value x, predicts the value of R(x) with probability at least
1
2 +  over all possible (x, S, R) triplets using T operations. Then there is an algorithm C which, given the
image S(x) of a randomly chosen (unknown) n-bit value x, produces a preimage of S(x) with probability
at least /2 (over all possible values of x and S) in time T ′:














where TS denotes the time complexity of computing m quadratic polynomials in n unknowns.
5.4. Security proof for the keystream generation
Now it is easy to see that if we sequentially apply Theorems 1, 2 and 4, we obtain the following
reduction theorem proved in Appendix E, which states that if, for a random system and a random
initial value, the L-bit keystream sequence was distinguishable from a random L-bit sequence, then
there would exist an efficient algorithm allowing us to find a preimage of the image of a random n-bit
input value via a random quadratic n-bit tom-bit system, which for suitably chosen values of nwould
contradict the assumptions made in Section 2 on the difficulty of solving MQ.
Theorem 5. Let L = λ(k − 1)n be the number of keystream bits produced using λ iterations of our
construction and let TS denote the time complexity of each iteration. Suppose there exists an algorithm
A that distinguishes the L-bit keystream sequence associated with a known randomly chosen system S of
m = kn multivariate quadratic polynomials in n unknowns and an unknown randomly chosen initial
internal state x ∈ {0, 1}n from a random L-bit sequence in time T with advantage . Then there exists an
algorithm C which, given the image S(x) of a randomly chosen (unknown) n-bit value x via a randomly
chosen n-bit to m-bit quadratic system S, produces a preimage of S(x) with probability at least 
23λ
over
all possible values of x and S in time upper bounded by T ′:
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Theorem5above relates to the keystreamgeneration part of QUADonly, not to the key and IV setup
computation for deriving the initial state. Moreover it does not guarantee the strength of a particular
instance of QUAD associated with a fixed system S, but (informally) it shows that for suitably chosen
parameter values most instances of QUAD are secure if MQ is intractable.
Theorem 5 is only valid over GF(2). A similar theorem is established in Berbain (2007) for any field
GF(q) by using a similar proof technique: the first part of the proof can be directly transposed; the
secondpart has to be adapted but the core idea remains; the third part is similar thanks to an extension
of the Goldreich–Levin theorem to GF(q) exposed in Goldreich et al. (1995). However the resulting
reduction is not tight: the adaptation of the second part requires the iteration of a modified version
of the reduction algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 2 a large number of times. However there is
ongoing work in extending the use of the Walsh transform computation in the proof of Lemma 3.
5.5. Specifying parameter values for QUAD
Wenowpropose concrete parameters n, k, and L for our construction.Wewant to ensure a security
level of at least 280. More precisely, we want Theorem 5 to ensure that the existence of a testing
algorithm that allows for a random system and a random initial internal state value at the beginning
of keystream generation to distinguish an L-bit keystreamproduced byQUAD from a uniformly drawn
keystream sequence with an advantage of more than  = 1100 in time less than T = 280 would imply
the existence of an inversion algorithm of non-negligible success probability ′ = 
23λ
allowing us,
given a randomn-bit to kn-bit systemof quadratic polynomials and the image S(x)under S of a random
input value x, to find a preimage under S of S(x) in time T ′ lower by a substantial factor, say 1
′ , than
that for the best known inversion algorithms for the MQ problem, and thus result in the existence of
a large set of weak instances of MQ.
Depending on the intended application of the pseudo-random number generator, the maximum
keystream length L can vary from a few hundreds bits to up to 240 bits. Consequently the allowed
parameter values for n and kwill also vary, since it ismuchmore demanding to get a security argument
for L = 240 bits than for L = 1000 bits. We will however retain the latter value L = 240 for a first
estimate of the corresponding required value of n.
In her thesis, Bardet (2004) shows that the best Gröbner basis algorithm for solving a system of kn











2k2 − 10k− 1+ 2(k+ 2)√k(k+ 2)) n.
To obtain a contradiction, we need to have T ′ substantially lower than T (k, n) by a factor of more
than 1
′ . Over GF(2), for k = 2 and with the previous values of L = 240, T = 280, and  = 1100 , we get
′ = 2−42 and we need to have n greater than 350. Still over GF(2) for n = 256 and k = 2, we only get
a contradiction if we produce less than L = 222 = 4 Mbits of keystream. The general case over GF(q)
does not allow us to get an improved performance due to the fact that the proof of security is not as
tight as for GF(2).
Parameter values recommended in practice: for QUAD over GF(2), we recommend in practice
an internal state length of n = 160 bits and an expansion factor k of 2 and a maximum keystream
length L = 240. For such values of n, k, and L, the former concrete security reduction is not applicable,
i.e. we do not get a contradiction as for the former parameter values. However, our proof reduction
is not optimal, and we conjecture that these parameter values suffice to provide the desired security
level of at least 280.
6. Extending the security proof to the key and IV setup
The security proof of the former section only relates to the keystream generation part of QUAD.
We now extend this proof to include the key and IV setup. Our aim is to relate the indistinguishability
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Fig. 1. Tree based construction.
of QUAD, more precisely of the family of IV to keystream functions indexed by the key K associated
with QUAD, to the conjectured intractability of the MQ problem. For that purpose, we view QUAD as
the composition of two functions:
• Akeyed initial state derivation functionwhich consists of the initial phase of the key and IV setup,
i.e. the derivation of the initial state before the runup phase. This part can be viewed as a family of
IV to initial state functions indexed by the key K . We will show that for suitably chosen parameter
sizes, this family of functions can be expected to be a PRF.
• An unkeyed initial state to keystream functionwhich consists of the runup phase of the key and
IV setup followed by the keystream generation. We will show that for suitably chosen parameter
sizes, this function can be expected to be a PRNG.
A simple composition theorem (which states essentially that the composition of a PRF and a PRNG
with fitting output and input lengths is a PRF) allows us then to derive a security reduction for the
whole cipher. All the results presented in this section except the final theorem are very general and
also apply to any PRNG.
6.1. PRF-indistinguishability of the initial state derivation function of QUAD
The key observation allowing us to establish that if the MQ problem is intractable then the initial
state derivation function of QUAD is secure is that this function results from applying the tree based
construction introduced by Goldreich et al. (1986) to the quadratic n-bit to 2n-bit function S ′ =
(S0, S1). Indeed, the IV bits determine a path leading from the key to the initial state in the binary
tree induced by S ′ and thus play exactly the role of the input bits in the tree based construction.
The tree based construction is a generic construction allowing us to derive a PRF from a PRNG. It
can be defined as follows. Let us consider a PRNG g : {0, 1}m −→ {0, 1}2m and let us denote the
2m-bit image of y ∈ {0, 1}m by g(y) = z0z1 . . . z2m−1. We derive from g two m-bit to m-bit functions
g0 : y ∈ {0, 1}m 7−→ z0, . . . , zm−1 and g1 : y ∈ {0, 1}m 7−→ zm, . . . , z2m−1.
The PRF F g is the family of functions {fy}y∈{0,1}m where
fy : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) 7−→ fy(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = gxn ◦ gxn−1 . . . ◦ gx1(y).
This construction is illustrated on Fig. 1. The following theorem relates the PRF-advantage for
distinguishing F g to the PRNG-advantage for distinguishing g . The proof (Appendix F) is essentially
the same as the security proof for the tree based construction given by Goldreich (2001), up to
the fact that we consider the concrete security model instead of the asymptotic polynomial time
indistinguishability model.
Theorem 6. Let g : {0, 1}m −→ {0, 1}2m be a number generator which generates 2m outputs bits in
time T 2mg and let F
g = {fy}y∈{0,1}m be the family of n-bit to m-bit functions derived from g by the tree
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based construction. The (t, q) PRF-advantage of F g is related to the single-query PRNG-advantage of g by
the following inequality:
AdvprfFg (t, q) ≤ nqAdvprngg (t + q(n+ 1)T 2mg ).
The application of Theorem 6 to the initial state derivation of QUAD is straightforward. We denote
by gS
′ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}2n the n-bit to 2n-bit function associated with S ′, and by F gS′ the resulting
family of initial state derivation functions. Theorem 6 allows us to relate the PRF-advantage for
distinguishing F g
S′





′ (t, q) ≤ 2qAdvprnggS′ (t + q(|IV | + 2)T 2ngS′ ).
Moreover, Theorem 5 above allows us to relate the PRNG-advantage for distinguishing gS
′
to the
hardness of inverting MQ.
6.2. PRNG-indistinguishability of the initial state to keystream function
Let us denote by gS : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}L the keystream generation function induced by the
iteration of the quadratic function S. The security of the number generator greal which starts by
iterating the function S n times without producing any keystream to reflect the runup of QUAD and
then produces L bits of keystream in the same way as gS is related to the security of g˜S : {0, 1}n −→
{0, 1}L+(k−1)n2 which iterates S to produce L+ (k− 1)n2 bits, since greal produces the same keystream
as g˜S up to the fact that the first (k − 1)n2 bits of g˜S are discarded. Consequently a distinguisher for
greal is also a distinguisher for g˜S . Thus the advantage of greal is upper bounded by the advantage of g˜S :
Advprnggreal (t) ≤ Advprngg˜S (t + T L+(k−1)n
2
g˜S ).
6.3. PRF-indistinguishability of the whole cipher
Now a simple composition theorem (Theorem 8 hereafter), whose proof can be found in Berbain
and Gilbert (2007) and in Appendix G, allows us to derive a security reduction related to the whole
cipher (Theorem 9 hereafter) from the two former results. We define the composition G of a family of
functions F and a function g , and relate the PRF-indistinguishability ofG to the PRF-indistinguishability
of F and the PRNG-indistinguishability of g .
Definition 7. The composition G = g ◦ F of an n-bit to m-bit family of functions F = {fK } and of an
m-bit to L-bit function g is the n-bit to L-bit family of functions
G = {g ◦ fK }.
Theorem 8. Let us consider F = {fK } where fK : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m is a function family and
g : {0, 1}m −→ {0, 1}L is a number generator that produces L bits in time T Lg . The (t, q) advantage of
G = g ◦ F = {g ◦ fK } can be upper bounded as follows:
AdvprfG (t, q) ≤ AdvprfF (t + qT Lg )+ qAdvprngg (t + qT Lg ).
The stream cipher QUAD results from the composition of the family of functions F g
S′
and the number
generator greal. Due to the composition theorem, Theorem 6, the security of QUAD can be related to
the security of F g
S′
and greal which can in turn, as established in the former sections, be related to the
security gS
′
and g˜S . We get the inequality
Advprfquad(t, q) ≤ 2qAdvprnggS′ (t + q(|IV | + 3)T LgS′ )+ qAdv
prng
g˜S (t + qT Lg˜S + T L+(k−1)n
2
g˜S ).
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The initial state derivation and initial state to keystream functions of QUAD are based on the
iteration of a randomly chosen quadratic system of km polynomials in m variables (with k = 2 for
S ′). If S ′ and S are equal (or S ′ consists of the 2n first polynomials of S) we have
Advprfquad(t, q) ≤ 3qAdvprnggS (t + q(|IV | + 3)T L+(k−1)n
2
g˜S ).
We can now relate the security of the whole stream cipher QUAD to the difficulty of the MQ
problem, i.e. show that if there exists an adversary able to distinguish QUAD from a perfect random
function in time t with q queries, then there exists a MQ solver. We estimate the time for computing
a quadratic polynomial in n variables to n2 and the time for computing a system of kn polynomials in
n unknowns to kn3. By considering the bounds provided by the above inequality and Theorem 5, we
get the following reduction theorem for the whole cipher.
Theorem 9. Let us define λ = L+(k−1)n2
(k−1)n . Suppose there exists an algorithm A which distinguishes an
instance of the stream cipher QUAD associated with a known random n-bit to kn-bit quadratic system S
that, given an |IV |-bit initial value IV , produces L keystream bits from a perfect random function in time T ,
with q queries, and a PRF-advantage . Then there exists an algorithm B which, given the image S(x) of a
randomly (unknown) n-bit value x under a randomly chosen n-bit to kn-bit quadratic system S, produces
a preimage of S(x)with probability at least 
3·23qλ over all possible values of x and S in time upper bounded
by T ′:












Now that we have extended the security proof of QUAD to include the key and IV setup we can,
as was done after the security proof of the keystream generation, propose parameter values for n, k,
L, |K |, and |IV | allowing us to get a concrete security reduction for whole stream cipher. We restrict
ourselves to the GF(2) case.Wewant to ensure a security level of at least 280. More precisely, wewant
Theorem9 to ensure that the existence of an algorithm allowing us, for a randomly chosen system S, to
distinguish the IV to keystream function induced by the stream cipher QUAD and a random key from
a random function with q queries and an advantage of more than  = 1100 in time less than T = 280
would imply the existence of an inversion algorithm of non-negligible success probability ′ = 
3·23λq
allowing us, given a random n-bit to kn-bit system of quadratic polynomials and the image S(x) of a
random input value x, to find a preimage of S(x) under S in time T ′ substantially lower, by a factor
of more than ′, than that for the best known inversion algorithms for the MQ problem, and thus the
existence of a large set of weak instances of MQ.
For k = 2 and with the previous values of L = 240, q = 240, T = 280, and  = 1100 , we get
′ = 2−78 andwe need to have n greater than 760. For n = 512 and k = 2, we only get a contradiction
if we produce less than L = 221 bits of keystream and allow up to q = 230 queries. These values
of n are higher than those for the keystream generation. However our proofs are not perfectly tight
and 760 bits is still quite low compared to the size that stream ciphers based on discrete log or RSA
would require. For such stream ciphers more than 3000 bits are necessary for a security strictly lower
than 280.
7. Software and hardware implementation of QUAD
Implementing QUAD either in software or in hardware essentially amounts to computing a system
of quadratic functions in n variables over GF(q). This holds for the key and IV setup and the runup and
keystream generation phases of QUAD, the main differences between the two phases being that the
numbers of quadratic functions that one has to compute at each iteration are n andm > n respectively.
For our implementations we consider the GF(2) version of QUAD with a 160-bit state
recommended earlier, in which a system of 320 polynomials in 160 variables is iterated. Although
n = 160 is not enough for the security reduction of QUAD to give any formal reduction argument, i.e.
any contradiction with the conjectured intractability of MQ, we believe that this is in practice a rather
conservative instance of QUAD.
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Software implementations of QUAD are investigated in Berbain et al. (2006a): several techniques
are described and compared over several fields. For our recommended version of QUAD over GF(2),
the order of magnitude of the encryption speeds obtained for the fastest implementations is 8 Mbit/s.
Increasing the size of the field enables us to enhance the encryption speed. However the security
reduction revealed before cannot be invoked and the parameters must be carefully chosen in order to
avoid attacks. Yang et al. (2007) shows that for instance a system of 40 equations in 20 variables over
GF(28) can be solved thanks to the XL-Wiedemann algorithm in a few hours and that the complexity
of attacking the variant of QUAD associated with the iteration of such a system is upper bounded by
263. Our recommended parameters (i.e. 320 equations in 160 variables over GF(2)) are out of reach of
such attacks.
It might seem at first glance that QUAD is not well fitted for hardware implementations because it
is impractical tomanage a large randomsystemof quadratic polynomials in hardware. However, if one
is willing to pseudo-randomly generate the fixed multivariate quadratic function S iterated by QUAD
by means of a simple non-linear number generator instead of generating S randomly, this results in
surprisingly good hardware performance: about 3500 Gate Equivalents (GE). Though one can argue
that the security reduction relating the indistinguishability of the QUAD output to the intractability
of a random MQ instance can no longer be invoked in such a setting and that moreover we are
considering smaller parameter sizes than those needed to get a strong formal security argument, we
think that the existence of a strong link between the security of QUAD and that of the underlying MQ
problem still provides a partial security argument in this setting. We implemented a binary version
of QUAD with state lengths of n = 160 on a Xilinx Virtex4 FPGA. In Arditti et al. (2007) we reveal two
main implementations: a compact version, where the area is minimized but the throughput is rather
low, and a second implementation that achieves a better trade-off between area and throughput. The
orders of magnitude of the gate counts are 3500 GE and 10000 GE, whereas the throughputs obtained
are approximately 10 kbit/s and 3.3 Mbit/s.
8. Conclusion
QUAD is a practical stream cipherwhose security is provably related, for suitable parameter values,
to the conjectured intractability of the MQ problem. Those parameters are determined thanks to the
complexity of the best known algorithm for solving multivariate quadratic systems of equations like
algorithms that are derived from Gröbner basis computation algorithms.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We are using a classical proof technique based on hybrid probability distributions. For
0 ≤ i ≤ λ, we introduce the probability distributions Di(S) over {0, 1}L respectively associated
with the random variables
t i(S, x) = (r1, r2, . . . , ri, Sout(x), Sout(Sin(x)), . . . , Sout(Sλ−i−1in (x))),
where the rj and x are random independent uniformly distributed values of {0, 1}(k−1)n and {0, 1}n
respectively. By convention, (r1, r2, . . . , ri) is the null string if i = 0 and (Sout(x), . . . , Sout(Sλ−i−1in (x)))
is the null string if i = λ. Consequently D0(S) is the distribution of the L-bit keystream, Dλ(S) is
the uniform distribution over {0, 1}L, and the Di(S) distributions, 0 ≤ i ≤ λ, are intermediate
between D0(S) and Dλ(S). We denote by pi(S) the probability that A accepts a random L-bit sequence
distributed according toDi(S), and denote by pi the average value of pi(S) over the (k−1)n(n (n+1)2 +1)-
dimensional vector space of quadratic systems S. The hypothesis about algorithm A amounts to
assuming that A distinguishes between D0(S) and Dλ(S) with advantage , in other words that
|p0 − pλ| ≥ . Algorithm B works as follows: for input (x1, x2) ∈ {0, 1}kn with x1 ∈ {0, 1}n and
x2 ∈ {0, 1}(k−1)n, it randomly selects an integer i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ λ − 1 and constructs the L-bit
vector
t(S, x1, x2) =
(
r1, r2, . . . , ri, x2, Sout(x1), Sout(Sin(x1)), . . . , Sout(Sλ−i−2in (x1))
)
.
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If (x1, x2) is distributed according to the output distribution of S, i.e. (x1, x2) = S(x) = (Sin(x), Sout(x))
for a uniformly distributed value of x, then
t(S, x1, x2) =
(
r1, r2, . . . , ri, Sout(x), Sout(Sin(x)), . . . , Sout(Sλ−i−1in (x))
)
is distributed according to Di(S). If (x1, x2) is distributed according to the uniform distribution, then
t(S, x1, x2) =
(
r1, r2, . . . , ri, x2, Sout(x1), Sout(Sin(x1)), . . . , Sout(Sλ−i−2in (x1))
)
.
Thus t(S, x1, x2) is distributed according to Di+1(S) in that case. In order to distinguish the output
distribution of S from the uniform law, algorithm B calls algorithm Awith inputs
(
S, t(S, x1, x2)
)
and










∣∣∣∣∣ = 1λ ∣∣p0 − pλ∣∣ ≥ λ .
Thus B distinguishes the output distribution of S from the uniform distribution with probability at
least 
λ
in time T + λTS . 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. In order to avoid having to manipulate the absolute value that appears in the expression for
A throughout the whole proof, we first show how to deduce from A an algorithm A′ which for input
(S, S(x)) returns 1 with probability at least 12 + 2 and for input (S, u), where u represents a uniformly
drawn kn-bit string, returns 1 with probability 12 . If the acceptance probability of A is larger (by at
least ) for an input (S, S(x)) than for a random input, then it suffices to consider A′ which for input
(S, r) either returns A(S, r) or draws a random value u and returns 1− A(S, u), with probability 12 for
each case. In the opposite situationwhere the acceptance probability of A is lower (by at least ) for an
input (S, S(x)) than for a random input, it suffices to consider A′ which for input (S, r) either returns
1− A(S, r) or draws a random value u and returns A(S, u), with probability 12 for each case.
Algorithm B works as follows. For inputs S = (Q1, . . .Qkn), R, and a kn-bit value y, B selects a
random kn-bit vector a = (a1, . . . , akn) and a random bit b, which represents an hypothesis for R(x).
Then it computes for all i from 1 to kn the quadratic polynomials Pi = Qi+ (ai ·R). All the polynomials
Pi form the quadratic system S ′. Then B invokes algorithm A′ with inputs the new quadratic system S ′
and the value y+ (b · a). Finally B returns what A′ returns.




) = yi + (ai · R(x)).
Suppose b is really equal to R(x); then S ′(x) = y+ (b · a), so the distinguisher A′ has been fed with
the random quadratic system S ′ = (P1, . . . , Pkn) and S ′(x):
PrS,x
(
B(S, S(x), R) = R(x)) = PrS′,x(A′(S ′, S ′(x)) = 1) ≥ 12 + 2 .
On the other hand, suppose b is not equal to R(x); then S ′(x) = y+ ((1+ b) · a) = (y+ (b · a))+ a.
Thus there is an error of a on the value furnished to A′ as compared with S ′(x). We have
PrS,x(B(S, S(x), R) = R(x)) = PrS′,x(A′(S ′, S ′(x)+ a) = 0).
However, since a is randomly drawn, the probability distribution of (S ′, S ′(x)+ a) is the same as that
of (S ′, u)where u is a random kn-bit variable. Thus,
PrS,x
(




















C. Berbain et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 44 (2009) 1703–1723 1717
The total running time of B is at most T + 2TS , since computing the kn Pi requires us for each i to
compute all the n(n−1)2 monomials of Qi and R, which does not cost more than two evaluations of the
system for some entry. 
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 3
We denote by Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the n-bit to 1-bit linear forms defined by Li(x) = xi, where x is
represented by the binary string x1x2 · · · xn. The idea of the proof is to call algorithm B sufficiently
many times to recover all the xi = Li(x) one by one. To do so, we introduce a parameter t , whose
order ofmagnitude is log nwhichwill be specified later.We use t randomly chosen n-bit to 1-bit linear
forms R1, . . . , Rt to randomize our requests to algorithm B. For each Li(x) that wewant to retrieve, we
call algorithm B 2t times, using the 2t linear combinations
⊕
j αjRj of the Rk forms as inputs to B in
order to randomize Li. Suppose we know the t values for Rj(x); then for any α we can also compute
the value of
⊕
j αjRj(x) and compare this value to B
(⊕
j αjRj ⊕ Li
)
by computing their exclusive or.
We define









If we make a correct assumption on the t values R1(x) to Rt(x) and if B returned the right value of
(
⊕










For each of the 2t possible values of α, we collect the vote C(i, α) on the value of Li(x). Since
algorithm B is supposed to answer correctly most of the time, taking the majority of the votes C(i, α)
will provide uswith the value of Li(x)with a high probability if we assume that 2t requests are enough.
The counterpart of this technique is that we have to guess the real values of Rj(x) for all j, but since t
is of logarithmic size this is achievable.
We now give a more formal proof with a small difference: we use fast Walsh transform
computations to simultaneously compute the 2t results of the votes on the C(i, α) values for all the
2t possible t-tuples of assumptions Rj(x), 1 ≤ j ≤ t , instead of computing the result of each vote
independently. This provides exactly the same results while allowing us to reduce the complexity.
Before we give the proof, we need to recall some results on the Walsh transform. Given a real
function g(x1, . . . , xt) of t binary variables, the Walsh transform of g is the real function of t binary
variables G = W (g) defined by
G(u1, . . . , ut) =
∑
x1,...,xt∈{0,1}t
g(x1, . . . , xt)(−1)u1x1+···+ut xt .
It is known that the time needed to compute the Walsh transform of a function of t binary variables
using the so called fast Walsh transform algorithm is t · 2t .
Proof. The algorithm C works as follows: first it randomly selects t elements R1, . . . , Rt of the n-
dimensional vector space over GF(2) of the n-bit to 1-bit linear forms.
Then for each i = 1, . . . , n it executes the followingprocess: for all the 2t possibleα = (α1, . . . , αt)
t-tuples of {0, 1}t , the 2t obtained values of (−1)B(
⊕
j αjRj⊕Li) are stored in a table of size 2t , say(
c(0), . . . , c(2t − 1)) with the convention that the coefficient c(α) associated with α is c(∑t−1j=0 αj ·
2j−1). Then the Walsh transform is applied to this table, which represents a function of α. This gives
2t numbers
(
β i(0), . . . , β i(2t − 1)) such that















The integer β i(k) is the difference of the numbers of 0 and 1 votes for Li(x) corresponding to the
assumption that Rj(x) = kj for all j lying between 1 and t . In other words, for this assumption
β i(k) = |{α|C(i, α) = 0}| − |{α|C(i, α) = 1}| .
Consequently if β i(k) is positive, then algorithm C sets bit i of the n-bit candidate value Ck associated
with the assumption k to C ik = 0; otherwise this bit is set to C ik = 1.
After this process has been completed for all the n values of i, one is left with a list of 2t n-
bit candidate values for x corresponding to each of the 2t assumptions for R1(x) to Rt(x). For each
candidate value Ck, algorithm C then computes f (Ck) and compares it to f (x). If a match occurs, C
keeps Ck in the list of at most 2t candidate values for x that it produces; otherwise Ck is discarded from
the list.
The total running time of algorithm C is n2t(T + t + 2) + 2tTf where Tf is the time needed to
compute f (y) for an n-bit value y.
Let us now upper bound the probability that algorithm C fails to select x in the list of candidate
preimages of f (x) that it produces. Over the 2t assumptions for R1(x) to Rt(x), only the correct one is
to be considered. The failure probability of C is upper bounded by the sum of the n probabilities pi that
the vote for Li(x) is incorrect and we have
pi = Pr
(





|{α|C(i, α) = Li(x)}| is the sum of the 2t pairwise independent binary random variables C(i, α) ⊕
Li(x) ⊕ 1 of average value µα ≥ 12 + 2 and variance vα = 14 − 
2
4 . Thus pi has average value






























Thus the failure probability of C is upper bounded by n
2t 2
. If we want to have a probability of
success for algorithm C higher than 12 , then we have to choose t such that 2
t = 2n
2
. Finally the total














as stated in the theorem. 
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We denote by N = 12n(n+ 1)+ 1 the dimension of the vector space of multivariate quadratic
polynomials in n binary variables. The assumption about algorithm B can be written as
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Pr(x,S,R)∈{0,1}n+mN+n
(
B(S, S(x), R) = R(x)) ≥ 1
2
+ .
Let us show that for a fraction at least  of all the (x, S) pairs one has
PrR∈{0,1}n
(





Otherwise, there would exist a fraction at least 1 −  of the (x, S) pairs whose associated
prediction probability over the R values would be strictly less than 12 + 2 , and therefore
Pr(x,S,R)∈{0,1}n+mN+n
(
B(S, S(x), R) = R(x)) would be upper bounded by the expression (1 − )( 12 +

2 ) +  = 12 +  − 2, which contradicts the assumption about Algorithm B. Thus for a fraction at
least  of all the (x, S) pairs the conditions of Lemma 3 are met and algorithm C of Lemma 3 provides
a preimage of S(x)with probability at least 1/2. The required time T ′ is simply obtained by replacing
 by 2 in the expression for the time needed by algorithm C in Lemma 3. 
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Theorems 1, 2 and 4 state that if an algorithm X exists, then another algorithm Y exists. In the
case of Theorem 1, the resulting algorithm B can directly play the role of algorithm A in Theorem 2. In
the case of Theorem 2, the resulting algorithm Y , named algorithm B, has the property
∀R ∈ {0, 1}N , Pr(x,S)∈{0,1}n+mN
(













Thus algorithm B of Theorem 2 can play the role of algorithm B in Theorem 4, and if we compose the
distinguishing probability and complexity expressions of the three concatenated theorems, we obtain
the claimed distinguishing probability and complexity bounds. 
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First we define, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, a family F gi of {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m functions; each F gi can be
viewed as an intermediate PRF between F g and the set F∗n,m of perfect random n-bit tom-bit functions.
• F g0 = {f gy0}y0∈{0,1}n where f gy0 : (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ gxn ◦ · · · ◦ gx1(y0).
• F g1 = {f gy0,y1}(y0,y1)∈{0,1}2n where
f gy0,y1 : (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ gxn ◦ · · · ◦ gx2(yx1).
• F gi = {f gy0,y1,...,y2i−1}y0,y1,...,y2i−1∈{0,1}2in where
f gy0,...,y2i−1 : (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ gxn ◦ · · · ◦ gxi+1(yx1...xi).
In the former expression yx1,...xi represents y∑it=1 xt2t−1 .
• F gn = {f gy0,y1,...,y2n−1}y0,y1,...,y2n−1∈{0,1}2n where
f gy0,...,y2n−1 : (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ (yx1...xn).
It is easy to see that F g0 is equal to F
g , and that F gn is the set F∗n,m of all n-bit tom-bit functions.
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Let us consider any (t, q) distinguishing algorithm A for F g , i.e. a testing algorithm capable of
querying an n-bit tom-bit oracle function up to q times, and let us denote its distinguishing probability
by
 = ∣∣Pr f∈Fg (Af = 1)− Pr f∈F∗n,m(Af = 1)∣∣.
We denote Pr f∈Fgi (A
f = 1) by pi. Thus we have
 = |p0 − pn|.
We now construct a q-query distinguisher B for g , which when input with a q-tuple (z1, . . . , zq) of
2m-bit words is using one invocation of algorithm A to output either 0 or 1. In order to processes an
input q-tuple (z1, . . . , zq), B first randomly draws an integer i lying between 0 and n − 1, and then
inputs (z1, . . . , zq) to a testing algorithm Bi, and outputs Bi’s binary output. Each testing algorithm Bi
is defined as follows: Bi invokes algorithm A and computes the answers to the up to q distinct n-bit
oracle queries of A. For that purpose, Bi uses its random generation capability to simulate an auxiliary
random function α : {0, 1}i −→ {1, q} that is initially undetermined. At each novel n-bit oracle query
xj = (xj1, . . . , xjn) of A, algorithm Bi uses:
• bits xj1 to xji to determine a 2m-bit value zk as follows: Bi first checks whether α is defined on point
(xj1, . . . , x
j
i) and, if it is not, it selects randomly a value in {1, q}, operates on it with α(xj1, . . . , xji)
and stores the new point of α; otherwise Bi simply reads the previously stored value — in both
cases, we denote by k the value of α(xj1, . . . , x
j
i) obtained; k is used to select the k-th input zk from
Bi’s input (z1, . . . , zq);
• bit xji+1 to select an m-bit word y equal to the substring of the m left bits of zk if xji+1 = 0, and of
them right bits of zk if x
j
i+1 = 1;
• bits xji+2 to xjn to compute As L-bit oracle response gxjn ◦ · · · ◦ gxji+2(y).
Finally when A halts, Bi also halts and returns A’s binary output. It is easy to see that:
• If Bi’s input is
(
g(a1), . . . , g(aq)
)
, where (a1, . . . , aq) is a randomly drawn q-tuple ofm-bit words,
then A’s oracle query and response pairs have exactly the same probability distribution as if Awere
run with an n-bit tom-bit oracle function f randomly drawn from the family F gi :
Pr
(
Bi((g(a1), . . . , g(aq)) = 1
) = Pr f∈Fgi (Af = 1) = pi.
• If Bi’s input is a randomly drawn q-tuple (z1, . . . , zq) of 2m-bit values, then A’s oracle queries and
response pairs have exactly the same probability distribution as if Awas run with an n-bit tom-bit
oracle function f randomly drawn from the family F gi+1:
Pr
(
Bi(z1, . . . , zq) = 1
) = Pr f∈Fgi+1(Af = 1) = pi+1.















However, algorithm B requires at most t + qnT 2mg , where t is the time required by A and T 2mg ′ is the
time required by g ′ to produce 2m bits. Therefore for any Awe have
AdvprfFg (A) ≤ nAdvprngg (t + qnT 2mg , q).
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Finally, since Advprngg (t + qnT 2mg , q) ≤ qAdvprngg (t + q(n + 1)T 2mg ), due to a classical lemma from
Goldreich and Krawczyk (1989) we obtain
AdvprfFg (t, q) ≤ qnAdvprngg (t + q(n+ 1)T 2mg ),
as stated in the theorem. 
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. We want to upper bound the advantage of an algorithm A that in time t with q requests
distinguishes a random instance gK = g ◦ fK of G = g ◦ F from a perfect random function g∗ ∈ F∗n,L.
We can write the advantage of A as
AdvprfG (A) =
∣∣Pr(AgK = 1)− Pr(Ag∗ = 1))∣∣.
A is making at most q distinct queries to an oracle function instantiated by gK or g∗. In order to
upper bound AdvprfG (A), we consider the intermediate situation where the oracle function is neither
gk nor g∗, but a random instance g ◦ f ∗ of the composition of a perfect random function f ∗ ∈ F∗n,m and
g . Due to the triangular inequality, we have
AdvprfG (A) ≤
∣∣Pr(AgK = 1)− Pr(Ag◦f ∗ = 1)∣∣+ ∣∣Pr(Ag◦f ∗ = 1)− Pr(Ag∗ = 1)∣∣.
We denote the first and the second absolute values of the right expression by δ1 and δ2.
Let us first upper bound δ2. It is easy to see that instantiating the oracle function ofAwith g◦f ∗ or g∗
amounts to answering the up to q distinct oracle queries of Awith a q-tuple
(
g(y1), . . . , g(yq)
)
of L-bit
values, where the q-tuple (y1, . . . , yq) is randomly drawn from {0, 1}mq, or with a q-tuple (z1, . . . , zq)
of answers randomly drawn from {0, 1}Lq. In both cases, the q-tuple of oracle answers is independent
of the up to q distinct values of the oracle queries. Using this fact we can derive an algorithm B
that distinguishes q values
(
g(x1), . . . , g(xq)
)
from q random values of {0, 1}L. Algorithm B works
as follows: for input (y1, . . . , yq) it runs algorithm A. Consequently it has to answer A’s n-bit oracle
queries xi with L-bit responses. On each distinct query xi, B simply answers yi. When A halts, B also
halts and returns the output of A. We can easily see that Pr
(
B(g(x1), . . . , g(xq)) = 1
) = Pr(Ag◦f ∗ = 1)
and that we have Pr
(
B(y1, . . . , yq) = 1
) = Pr(Ag∗ = 1). Consequently we have
δ2 = Advprngg (B) ≤ Advprngg (t, q).
A classical lemma from Goldreich and Krawczyk (1989), which relates the advantage of a multiple-
query distinguisher for a random number generator to the advantage of a single-query distinguisher,
now provides
δ2 ≤ qAdvprngg (t + qT Lg ).
In order to upper bound AdvprfG (A) we still have to upper bound δ1. This can be done by deriving
from algorithm A an algorithm C that is able by invoking A one single time to distinguish a random
instance of the n-bit tom-bit PRF F from a perfect random function f ∗ ∈ F∗n,m with an advantage also
equal to δ1.
Algorithm C has access to an n-bit to m-bit oracle function f . C works as follows. First it invokes
algorithm A. Consequently it has to answer A’s n-bit oracle queries xi with L-bit responses. For each
query,C queries its ownoracle function f with the samequery value xi, gets anm-bit answer yi = f (xi),
computes the L-bit value g(yi), and answers this value to algorithm A. When A halts, C halts as well
and outputs the same output as A. Therefore we have Pr(C fK = 1) = Pr(Ag◦fK = 1) = Pr(AgK = 1)
and Pr(C f ∗ = 1) = Pr(Ag◦f ∗ = 1). This implies that ∣∣Pr(C fK = 1) − Pr(C f ∗ = 1)∣∣ is equal to∣∣Pr(AgK = 1)− Pr(Ag◦f ∗ = 1)∣∣, i.e.
AdvprfF (C) = δ1.
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Furthermore, the time required for algorithm C is equal to the time required for algorithm A plus
q times the time of computing g . Therefore AdvprfF (C) is upper bounded by Adv
prf
F (t + qT Lg , q), i.e.
δ1 ≤ AdvprfF (t + qT Lg , q). Finally we have for any A
AdvprfG (A) ≤ δ1 + δ2 ≤ AdvprfF (t + qT Lg , q)+ qAdvprngg (t + qT Lg ).
Consequently
AdvprfG (t, q) ≤ AdvprfF (t + qT Lg , q)+ qAdvprngg (t + qT Lg ). 
References
Arditti, D., Berbain, C., Billet, O., Gilbert, H., 2007. Compact FPGA Implementations of QUAD. In: ASIACCS. ACM.
Bardet, M., 2004. Étude des systèmes algébriques surdéterminés. Applications aux codes correcteurs et à la cryptographie. Ph.D.
Thesis. Université Paris VI.
Bellare, M., 1999. The Goldreich–Levin Theorem. Available from URL: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/courses.html.
Berbain, C., 2007. Analyse et conception d’algorithmes de chiffrement à flot. Ph.D. Thesis. Université Paris VII.
Berbain, C., Billet, O., Gilbert, H., 2006a. Efficient implementations of multivariate quadratic systems. In: Selected Areas in
Cryptography – SAC 2006. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag.
Berbain, C., Gilbert, H., 2007. On the security of IV dependent stream ciphers. In: Biryukov, A. (Ed.), FSE. In: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag.
Berbain, C., Gilbert, H., Patarin, J., 2006b.QUAD:Apractical streamcipherwithprovable security. In: Vaudenay, S. (Ed.), Advances
in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2006. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag.
Blum, L., Blum,M., Shub, M., 1986. A simple unpredictable pseudo-random number generator. SIAM J. Comput. 15 (2), 364–383.
Blum, M., Micali, S., 1984. How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits. SIAM J. Comput. 13 (4),
850–864.
Boneh, D., Halevi, S., Howgrave-Graham, N., 2001. The modular inversion hidden number problem, In: ASIACRYPT, pp. 36–51.
Buchberger, B., 1965. Ein Algorithmus zum Auffinden der Basiselemente des Restklassenringes nach einem nulldimensionalen
Polynomideal (An algorithm for finding the basis elements in the residue class ring modulo a zero dimensional polynomial
ideal). Ph.D. Thesis. Mathematical Institute, University of Innsbruck, Austria.
Cannière, C.D., Preneel, B., 2005. Trivium: Specifications. eSTREAM, ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project, Report 2005/001. Available
at: http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream.
Courtois, N., Goubin, L., Meier, W., Tacier, J.-D., 2002. Solving underdefined systems of multivariate quadratic equations, In:
Public Key Cryptography, pp. 211–227.
Courtois, N., Klimov, A., Patarin, J., Shamir, A., 2000. Efficient algorithms for solving overdefined systems of multivariate
polynomial equations. In: Preneel, B. (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2000. In: Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 1807. Springer-Verlag, pp. 392–407.
Courtois, N., Patarin, J., 2003. About the XL algorithm over GF(2). In: Joye, M. (Ed.), Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2003.
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2612. Springer-Verlag, pp. 141–157.
Ekdahl, P., Johansson, T., 2002. A new version of the stream cipher SNOW. In: Nyberg, K., Heys, H.M. (Eds.), Proceedings of
Selected Areas in Cryptography — SAC’02. In: LNCS, vol. 2595. Springer.
Faugère, J.-C., 1999. A new efficient algorithm for computing Gröbner bases (F4). J. Pure Appl. Algebra.
Faugère, J.-C., Imai, H., Kawazoe,M., Sugita, M., Ars, G., 2004. Comparison between XL and Groebner basis algorithms. In: Lee, P.J.
(Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2004. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3329. Springer-Verlag,
pp. 338–353.
Fischer, J.-B., Stern, J., 1996. An Efficient Pseudo-random generator provably as secure as syndrome decoding, In: EUROCRYPT,
pp. 245–255.
Fraenkel, A.S., Yesha, Y., 1980. Complexity of solving algebraic equations. Inform. Process. Lett. 10 (4/5), 178–179.
Garey, M.R., Johnson, D.S., 1979. Algebraic equations over GF(2). In: Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of
NP-Completeness. W H Freeman & Co, (Chapter 7.2).
Goldreich, O., 2001. The Foundations of Cryptography — Volume 1. Cambridge University Press.
Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., 1986. How to construct random functions. J. ACM 33 (4), 792–807.
Goldreich, O., Krawczyk, H., 1989. Sparse pseudorandom distributions. In: Brassard, G. (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO
’89. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.435. Springer-Verlag, pp. 113–127.
Goldreich, O., Levin, L.A., 1989. A hard-core predicate for all one-way functions. In: Johnson, D.S. (Ed.), 21th ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing – STOC ’89. ACM Press, pp. 25–32.
Goldreich, O., Rubinfeld, R., Sudan, M., 1995. Learning polynomials with queries: The highly noisy case, In: FOCS, pp. 294–303.
Goldwasser, S., Bellare, M., 2001. Lecture Notes on Cryptography. Available at: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/courses.
html.
Halevi, S., Coppersmith, D., Jutla, C.S., 2002. Scream: A software-efficient stream cipher. In: Daemen, J., Rijmen, V. (Eds.), Fast
Software Encryption — FSE 2002. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2365. Springer-Verlag, pp. 195–209.
Håstad, J., Impagliazzo, R., Levin, L.A., Luby, M., 1999. A pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. SIAM J. Comput.
28 (4), 1364–1396.
Håstad, J., Näslund, M., 2000. BMGL: Synchronous keystream generator with provable security (submitted to Nessie Project).
Hell, M., Johansson, T., Meier, W., 2005. Grain — A stream cipher for constrained environments. ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project
Report 2005/001. http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream.
Impagliazzo, R., Naor, M., 1996. Efficient cryptographic schemes provably as secure as subset sum. J. Crypt. 9 (4), 199–216.
C. Berbain et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 44 (2009) 1703–1723 1723
Kipnis, A., Patarin, J., Goubin, L., 1999. Unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes. In: Stern, J. (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology
— EUROCRYPT ’99, vol. 1592. Springer, pp. 206–222.
Lidl, R., Niederreiter, H., 1997. Finite Fields. Cambridge University Press.
Patarin, J., 1996. Hidden fields equations (HFE) and isomorphisms of polynomials (IP): Two new families of asymmetric
algorithms. In: Maurer, U.M. (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT’96, vol. 1070. Springer, pp. 33–48.
Patarin, J., Goubin, L., 1997. Asymmetric cryptography with S-Boxes, In: ICICS, pp. 369–380.
Rivest, R., 1992. The RC4 Encryption Algorithm. RSA Security Inc.
Shamir, A., 1981. On the generation of cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences. In: ICALP, pp. 544–550.
Steinfeld, R., Pieprzyk, J., Wang, H., 2006. On the provable security of an efficient RSA-based pseudorandom generator, In:
ASIACRYPT, pp.194–209.
Yang, B.-Y., Chen, O.C.-H., Bernstein, D.J., Chen, J.-M., 2007. Analysis of QUAD. In: Biryukov, A. (Ed.), FSE. In: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag.
Yao, A., 1982. Theory and applications of trapdoor function. In: Foundations of Cryptography FOCS 1982.
